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Abstract: Several management paradigms—traditional public administration,
new public administration, new public management (NPM), and networked
governance—have been leaders in practice and in the academic world of public
administration at different time periods. However all these management paradigms
have a negative aspect in common—a “one-size-fits-all” approach to government
reforms. This study tries to overcome this approach, utilizing a contingent method.
Each of the four paradigms has been suggested for adoption in one or two areas
of different policy types based on a two-by-two table with the dimensions of
high and low with respect to market mechanisms and high and low on the
explicitness of the politics-administration dichotomy. The study proposes that
traditional public administration would be the appropriate choice in the areas of
redistributive and constituent policy. New public administration would work
well for regulatory policy, whereas networked governance and NPM (customer-
oriented practices) would be the right choice in the arena of distributive policy.
Keywords: traditional public administration, new public administration, NPM,
network governance, regulatory policy, distributive policy, redistributive policy,
constituent policy, contingent approach
INTRODUCTION
Once accepted as a novel public-sector reform movement in the early 1990s, new
public management (NPM) has been “new” for so many years that it is now acknowl-
edged as a “middle-aged” concept. Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, and Tinkler (2005, 
p. 468) have even declared that “New Public Management is dead” and that “the torch
of leading-edge change has passed on from NPM and will not return.” Accordingly,
some scholars have identified a newly emerging management paradigm that they refer
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to as “public value management” (Stoker, 2006) or “new public service” (Denhardt &
Denhardt, 2003), which centers its practice on a system of interactions between relevant
actors and features networked governance.
However, we should note that in any era the dominant paradigm is not a panacea.
That is, currently popular management thinking is not applicable to all management
practices. In real situations, there is no one best answer but many possible solutions
(Behn, 1998, p. 140). Methods and actions should fit circumstances because outcomes
generally vary according to them (Alford & Hughes, 2008, p. 138). This argument is
supported by studies comparing various public service areas in terms of the degree of
reform success (Syrett, Jones, & Sercombe, 1997; Pollitt, Birchall, & Putnam, 1998;
Jones, 2001; Walker, 2001; Walker & Enticott, 2004). Any management reform or
social intervention can be effective in some situations while producing unfavorable
consequences in others. This suggests a need for avoiding the “one-size-fits-all”
approach to government reforms in which reformers engage in the uncritical and 
universal adoption of reform methods. Many scholars have made this argument (e.g.,
Hood & Peters, 2004; Stoker, 2006; Alford & Hughes, 2008), but few have provided
guidance on how to solve the problem.
The present study proposes a new but integrative approach to applying various
public management paradigms that consider situational factors. The proposed
approach is integrative in that it does not rely on just one management paradigm.
Instead, it takes into account all management paradigms considered in the analysis
because each has its own strengths and weaknesses. That is, all paradigms occupy
their own niches where they can be applied effectively (strength) but are less successful
(weakness) in non-niche areas. For situational factors, I have adopted policy goals. All
management approaches have to deal with various policy areas, including agriculture,
industry, housing, defense, international relations, government restructuring, housing,
social services, and social security. All policy initiatives have their own purposes or
goals that can be generalized as regulatory, distributive, redistributive, and constituent,
among others, based on Lowi’s (1972; 1985) policy scheme. It is legitimate to use his
scheme here because policy researchers have generally accepted it and (more impor-
tantly) it incorporates the critical fact that all policy initiatives are goal oriented.
I present this study’s exploration of the relationship between management paradigms
and policy goals in four parts. First I consider the historical development of management
paradigms from traditional public administration through new public administration
and NPM to networked governance. I then classify management paradigms into four
quadrants of a two-by-two table based on two dimensions: the politics-administration
dichotomy and market mechanism. Next, I briefly conceptualize policy types by drawing
on Lowi’s (1972) well-known policy scheme and provide a theoretical analysis in
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which the match (or fit) between a policy goal and a managerial paradigm is made.
Finally, I conclude with some practical suggestions for government reforms and future
research.
THE EVOLUTION OF MANAGEMENT PARADIGMS
Traditional Public Administration
The traditional public administration approach relies heavily on a Weberian view
of the world. The core of Weber’s thought lies in the idea that direct democracy is not
a viable option for most decision-making processes. Thus, the representative form of
democracy—so-called elite democracy—constitutes the heart of traditional public
administration. Under elite democracy, competing political leaders define the public
interest. This form of representative democracy is supposed to be flexible enough to
strike a balance between various interests and cultivate policies that can address
changing circumstances (Stoker, 2006, p. 44).
Traditional public administration is in line with the idea of the politics-administra-
tion dichotomy. Public managers are agents of elected politicians, and it is presumed
that they will faithfully implement the policies that their principals (i.e., politicians)
develop through political discussions and debates. Traditional public administration
advocates bureaucracy as an effective tool for meeting increasing demands on the
modern state. Such demands come mainly from welfare policy areas that can be managed
only through the standardization of administrative responses, that is, via a rational-
legal bureaucracy.
Bureaucracy ensures organizational effectiveness, such as stability and predictability
in a number of ways. First, it institutes a hierarchical division of labor. Through this
central feature of bureaucracy, complicated administrative problems are divided into
manageable and recurring tasks, and each task is placed under the jurisdiction of a
defined office (Beetham, 1987). Second, the management position is considered a 
full-time vocation or career for the official and features continuity and long-term
advancement. Third, there are prescribed rules that govern the work of officials that
are meant to ensure that clients (the public) are treated without arbitrariness or
favoritism. Fourth, and finally, officials are placed in positions based on merit, not
political favoritism, because administrative positions in the bureaucracy generally
require expert training and full-time work in each defined area of responsibility.
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New Public Administration
In the late 1960s and 1970s, amid the increasingly turbulent environment in the
United States after the civil rights movement, the traditional public administration
approach came under attack by a group of scholars who advocated a philosophy that
came to be known as new public administration (Marini, 1971; Waldo, 1971; Meier,
1993, pp. 201-205). Young students sponsored by Dwight Waldo criticized administra-
tors for injustices in the modern state and tried to reframe the value of public adminis-
tration at a 1968 conference held at the Minnowbrook conference center. According to
them, traditional public administration’s administrative tools were supposed to have
eradicated arbitrariness and political favoritism, but, in fact, they systematically facili-
tated the biased treatment of races and classes. For example, administrative procedures
incorporating the features of impersonality, written forms, and lengthy steps for
receiving services or benefits are acceptable to the white middle class but are hurdles
for the poor and minority groups (Goodsell, 1981).
Thus, new public administration attempts to promote conditions that can facilitate
social equity. In this regard, the movement incorporates values into the jurisdiction of
administration. This is quite different from what traditional public administration 
pursues, namely, the neutrality of administration or neutral competence. To achieve
social equity, new public administration may advocate the interests (i.e., enhanced
political power and economic well-being) of the disadvantaged or may even call for
disregarding those of the better represented by changing those policies and structures
that systematically hinder social equity.
Decentralization and ending the status quo are two important measures that can
help achieve social equity. First, agencies and their organizational structures should be
decentralized so that individuals impacted by a particular program have more control
over the program. Maximum feasible participation may be the best example of such
client involvement. Frederickson (2010) found that maximum feasible participation
can give ghetto residents the impression that they have the ability to influence publicly
made decisions that influence their well-being, although it is not justifiable in terms of
economy and efficiency. In short, new public administration upholds democratic
norms and practices, norms and practices that can be achieved through decentralizing
the structure of policy making. Ending the status quo is another measure of new public
administration. The most radical form of this measure involves confrontations. A city
personnel director may confront the chief of police and the police agency regarding
the issue of eligibility standards for new patrolmen, arguing that the height and weight
requirements are unrealistic and systematically discriminate against certain minority
groups (Frederickson, 2010, p. 14).
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Despite these innovative measures, the idea of new public administration has only
found traction among its academic advocates in the field of public administration.
That is, politicians and practitioners have rarely endorsed it (Guy, 1989; Daley, 1984;
Evans, 1981). Frederickson (2010), a leading scholar of new public administration, has
observed that “by the mid-1980s, the phrase ‘new public administration’ was seldom
heard outside of the textbooks” (p. 4). Because it advocates a socially delicate issue
(social equity) and employs provocative methods such as confrontation, new public
administration may not be able to penetrate the government under its label. That is,
new public administration has never been a government-wide and worldwide reform
movement, unlike NPM in the 1980s and 1990s.
New Public Management
The NPM movement across the Western world originated from a critique that public
service organizations are inclined to be monopolized by the interests of producers,
such as bureaucrats and other rank-and-file employees. According to this critique,
public service organizations are likely to be both inefficient in saving public money
and unresponsive to the public’s demands. A solution to these problems is to shatter
the monopolistic structure of public service delivery and construct incentives and tools
that can impact the way public service organizations perform (Stoker, 2006, p. 45).
Dunleavy et al. (2005, p. 470) identify three main integrating themes in NPM: disaggre-
gation (the division of large public-sector hierarchies into wider and flatter hierarchies
as large private firms move from U-shaped to M-shaped structures), “competition”
(the separation of purchasers from providers to increase competition among potential
providers, which can reduce public provision and diversify suppliers), and “incentiviza-
tion” (the placing of greater emphasis on pecuniary-based and specific performance
incentives). In short, NPM seeks to break down the bureaucratic backbone of the
Weberian model of traditional public administration (Stoker, 2006, p. 46) by developing
a wider range of service providers and a more market-oriented approach to management.
Despite NPM’s efforts to differentiate itself from traditional public administration,
it shares an important value as far as governance structure goes, namely, the imperative
to keep politics separate from administration. NPM holds that a politician’s role is to set
rigorous targets and make difficult choices regarding budgets, leaving administration
to public managers (Stoker, 2006, p. 46). Just as an ideal Weberian bureaucracy protects
its professionals, a good NPM system provides public managers with a degree of man-
agement freedom. However, politicians under NPM make the final judgment on the
performance of public managers in terms of their goal achievement.
In spite of its intention to reform the practices of traditional public administration,
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NPM produced unintended outcomes. Contrary to what its reformers expected, NPM
augmented formalities and increased the number of regulations public agencies were
subject to in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Light, 1993; Hood et al., 1999; Jones &
Thompson, 1999). Therefore, advocates of NPM now seldom expect it to improve the
overall effectiveness of government (Dunleavy et al., 2005, p. 468).1
Networked Governance
Unlike traditional public administration and NPM, networked governance, an emerging
paradigm, incorporates politics into management. The idea of networked governance
originates from a concern over how to get public officials to work effectively with
politicians (Goss, 2001; Smith, 2003). However, the goal of the effort to integrate the
two separate realms is to enhance public value. In this regard, networked governance
shares something in common with new public administration, which pursued a public
value, social equity.
Under the networked governance paradigm, politics plays a positive role as a mech-
anism for social coordination. Stoker (2006, p. 47) argues that this is important for
three reasons. First, politics enables people to cooperate and make decisions based on
something beyond the individualism that drives the market. Second, the flexible nature
of political decision making makes it possible to deal with uncertainties, ambiguities,
and unexpected changes. Finally, politics builds a social process through which
diverse interests are brought together to achieve a common purpose.
Networked governance is understood through the following propositions, which
make clear the role of politics in it (Stoker, 2006, pp. 47-49). First, the underlying 
philosophy of public managers is to create public value (Moore, 1995), to advance
favorable social and economic outcomes. An evaluation of the delivery of public value
requires debates and deliberations between relevant stakeholders and government offi-
cials. Second, networked governance relies on the stakeholder conception of legitimacy
in its governance arrangements (i.e., for decision to count as legitimate, all stakeholders
must be involved). Third, effective procurement demands an open-minded approach
that enables bureaucrats to recognize the best suppliers (regardless of whether they are
in the public, private, or voluntary sector), those that can contribute to the promotion
of community well-being and meet the needs of individuals (Aldridge & Stoker,
2002). Finally, there is a need for an adaptable and learning-based approach to public
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1. In fact, a number of researchers have identified the limitations of NPM (e.g., Kickert, 1997,
deLeon & Denhardt, 2000, Terry, 1993, Kaboolian, 1998, Thompson & Riccucci, 1998,
Kim, 2010, and Kim & Kaneko, 2011, pp. 148-149).
service delivery. The ideal public manager is engaged in a process of continuous eval-
uation and learning through steering networks of deliberation and delivery. However,
his or her ultimate role should be to ensure that his or her action brings about net social
benefits.
CATEGORIZATION OF MANAGEMENT PARADIGMS
Woodrow Wilson’s Statements: Two Dimensions
Wilson’s famous essay “The Study of Administration” (1887) defines two critical
elements of public administration—the politics-administration dichotomy and the
adoption of businesslike practices (or market mechanisms). Wilson asserts that the
“field of administration is the field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife
of politics” and “lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions
are not political questions” even if “politics sets the tasks for administration” ([1887]
1941, p. 20). Through these famous citations Wilson offered the following two impor-
tant messages. First, although policies are to be discussed and decided by politicians,
they should be neutrally implemented through a professional bureaucracy. Second,
businesslike practices should guide administration. Here the two elements—the poli-
tics-administration dichotomy and the adoption of business-like practices or market
mechanism—will be used for the classification of four management paradigms.
The Politics-Administration Dichotomy
The first message by Wilson (1887) concerns the separation of administrative
processes from the influence of politics (i.e., the Congress or the President). The
bureaucracy is supposed to limit its duty to administration (Goodnow, 1900). In line
with this trend, early reformers developed council-manager plans for local governments
in which the council makes policies and the city manager executes it. However, this
practice of enforcing a separation between politics and administration increasingly
broke down (Denhardt, 1999, p. 17) as public managers started to be drawn into the
policy-making process, and after World War II, the distinction became untenable.
Waldo (1948), Appleby (1949), Dahl (1947), and Long (1949) thoroughly dismantled
the standing of the idealized dichotomy in the field of public administration, rejecting
it as a false description of reality. “Public administration,” Appleby declared, “is policy-
making” (1949, p. 170).
To some extent, public managers’ increasing involvement in the policy-making
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process was attributable to the fact that the management of government organizations
was becoming more complex, and the legislative branch of government realized the
difficulty of being knowledgeable about every facet of government (Denhardt, 1999,
p. 17). Consequently, the legislative branch was forced to delegate a substantial portion
of its policy-making authority to public agencies that were endowed with technical
and professional expertise. However, this sharing of policy-making power with the
legislative branch meant that public managers often found themselves caught between
the imperatives—efficiency, on the one hand, and responsiveness, on the other, and
between bureaucracy, on the one hand, and democracy, on the other.
Public managers are expected to manage public organizations in the most efficient
manner possible, getting things done in a prompt and least costly manner. On the other
hand, these managers are supposed to be always attentive to the needs of the citizenry
regardless of whether those needs are communicated through the chief executive,
through the legislature, or directly (Denhardt, 1999, p. 19). Similarly, public managers
are expected encourage widespread participation and involvement by citizens in the
policymaking process (Redford, 1969, p. 8), but the bureaucratic structure can make
this kind of democratic participation difficult. That is, against participation and
involvement, there stands the bureaucratic culture of top-down decision-making and
authority (Denhardt, 1999, p. 19).
In this sense, these two issues (efficiency vs. responsiveness and bureaucracy vs.
democracy) can be subsumed under the politics-administration dichotomy. That is,
efficiency and bureaucracy can be seen as facets of administration, whereas respon-
siveness and democracy can be regarded as aspects of politics. Once the role of public
managers in the policy-making process became more apparent after World War II,
concerns began to arise over responsiveness and democracy in the administrative
sphere. Consequently, the degree of separation between politics and administration
will vary in accordance with management paradigms and can be classified into as
either high or low.
Market Mechanisms (Businesslike Practices)
Wilson’s claim that the “field of administration is the field of business” ([1887]
1941, p. 20) implies that administration should reflect businesslike practices. Wilson’s
statement has worked as a powerful justification for reformers who have applied vari-
ous management techniques and methods used in the private sector to the sphere of
public management. That is, these reformers interpret Wilson’s statement to mean that
public management is not distinct from business administration. Consequently, many
government organizations have been designed to resemble private firms (Rainey, 2003,
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p. 59). Many public organizations perform businesslike functions and generate their
own revenues through the sale of products and services and other means. Furthermore,
the public and private sectors have overlapped and become intertwined in a number of
ways in recent years. Through contracts, grants, vouchers, subsidies, and franchises,
governments make arrangements for the delivery of health care, sanitation services,
research services, and a number of other services in conjunction with private-sector
organizations (Rainey, 2003, p. 60). The “commercialization” of government organi-
zations may compromise their public service mission or the public interest. The degree
to which government organizations are commercialized or adopt market mechanisms
in their practice may vary by the management paradigm they pursue as well and can
be classified as high or low.
Classification of the Four Management Paradigms
Figure 1 shows the combination of the two dimensions discussed thus far (i.e., the
politics-administration dichotomy and market mechanisms) resulting in the four cate-
gories. Traditional public administration is categorized as high on the politics-adminis-
tration dichotomy but low with respect to market mechanisms. This management para-
digm is classified as high on the politics-administration dichotomy because it is rooted
in the idea that the role of public managers ought to be limited to ensuring that rules
and procedures are properly followed in the implementation of policies.
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Figure 1. Categorization of Management Paradigms
Furthermore, traditional public administration is categorized as low with respect to
market mechanisms because of its nature as a “closed-system” (Rainey, 2003, p. 50;
Kettl, 2002, p. 101). The students of the closed system represented by Max Weber liken
an organization to a machine “whose own operation is substantially unaffected by its
environment” (Kettl, 2002, p. 101). In other words, traditional public administration relies
exclusively on its internal structure and operations, such as stability and predictability
through hierarchy, and written rules, to achieve organizational effectiveness. In this
management paradigm, the external environment, such as the market, is not under-
stood to be an alternative measure of service provision, as it is in NPM or networked
governance; thus it is low with respect to market mechanisms.
New public administration is categorized as low on the politics-administration
dichotomy as well as with respect to market mechanisms. It is understood as having a
low degree of separation between politics and administration because of the emphasis
it puts on involvement of employees and clients (in particular, the disadvantaged and
the poor) in the policymaking process for the achievement of social equity. That is,
under the new public administration, the area of administration is blurred by that of
politics. In addition, like traditional public administration the new public administration
is categorized as low with respect to market mechanisms because it does not adopt
methods of the private sector to deliver public services.
NPM is categorized as high on the politics-administration dichotomy as well as
with respect to market mechanisms. This is because, as already noted, the role of public
managers in NPM is limited to faithfully implementing what politicians decide (Stoker,
2006, p. 46), and then politicians make the final judgment on what the managers
achieved in terms of the goals set by the politicians. In addition, NPM argues for the
government’s use of means similar to those used in the private sector, a proposition
that is based on the assumption that public and private organizations are sufficiently
alike (e.g., privatization and contracting: Barzelay, 2001; Kettl, 2002). That is, NPM is
a management paradigm that aims to commercialize public management by providing
customer-oriented services and by setting performance targets and incentives, among
others; thus, it is high with respect to market mechanisms.
Networked governance is categorized as low on the politics-administration dichotomy
but high with respect to market mechanisms. It is low on the politics-administration
dichotomy because it does not seek to keep politics at arm’s length but rather considers
it as central to management practices (Stoker 2006, p. 46). That is, under networked
governance public managers are supposed to create public value by participating in the
policy-making process (Moore, 1995, p. 57). In addition, networked governance is
categorized as high with respect to market mechanisms because it has inherited many
strategies that emphasize businesslike practices from NPM. For example, networked
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governance uses open competition among the public, private, and voluntary sectors to
identify the best supplier. This mechanism ensures that the focus is on end results
(Stoker, 2006, p. 48). Moreover, NPM emphasizes a performance culture (which
encourages strong commitment to services for individuals and community) to guarantee
world-class service delivery (Aldridge & Stoker, 2002).
Common Features of Management Paradigms
The high degree of separation between politics and administration shared by tradi-
tional public administration and NPM is associated with the value of neutral competence
or efficiency (see figure 1). Traditional public administration calls for the establishment
of a highly skilled bureaucracy insulated from political interference so that neutral
competence or efficiency can be achieved by it. Likewise, NPM also seeks to keep
politics out of government agencies so as to enable the achievement of bureaucratic
efficiency (Kaboolian, 1998, p. 190).2
The low degree of separation between politics and administration, which is shared
by new public administration and networked governance, leads to more responsive
and democratic governments. It means that the legislative branch is no longer the
dominant policy maker but rather shares policy-making power with the administrative
branch and others (Meier, 1993, p. 49). Yet the bureaucratic policy-making power 
delegated by the legislative branch is in turn allocated to individuals and pressure
groups, whose participation in the policy-making process has been highlighted as a
means of making bureaucracy more responsive and democratic. As demonstrated by
the case of maximum feasible participation, new public administration encourages the
involvement of the disadvantaged and the poor in the policy-making process to make
public management more responsible to their needs. Networked governance calls for a
democratic process based on continuous interactions between the government and the
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2. However, for traditional public administration, the perceived danger is that politicians outside
the bureaucracy are not be able to exercise any real control to ensure its responsiveness to
elected officials. For NPM, the dilemma occurs when the system or bureaucracy appears to
cease responding to politics, as public mangers pursue their private goals instead of focusing
on changing and flexible objectives of the political system (Stoker 2006, p. 55). The problem
becomes more severe when broad targets of the system designated by politicians are nego-
tiated with public managers. Therefore, under NPM, citizens are likely to perceive themselves
as mere customers who are not permitted to question the goals of service delivery (Stoker,
2006, p. 56). Consequently, NPM rests on a trade-off that makes efficiency the most
important goal, reflecting the view that “management is king,” a view that sidelines politics
(Stoker, 2006, p. 56).
governed whereby they can learn from each other and produce solutions. Networked
governance ensures democracy by opening up the governance system as far as possible
to relevant stakeholders.
Traditional public administration and new public administration both embrace
process-oriented management practices as a result of their deemphasis on market
mechanisms. Process-oriented or rule-oriented management is particularly strict when
the organizational goals are conflicting or ambiguous, which is the case under the elite
democracy that guides traditional public administration. Under the elite democracy,
political leaders are supposed to be flexible enough to balance various interests and
make policies that can address changing circumstances. That is, the objectives of public
policies made under the elite democracy (i.e., traditional public administration) tend to
be conflicting and ambiguous. The difficulty in specifying and measuring policy
goals, which makes market mechanisms inappropriate, causes public officials to try to
manage agencies by enforcing rigid procedures and rules rather than by evaluating policy
outcomes. Thus, under traditional public administration, government manages demands
from civil society (e.g., welfare-benefits related services) through the standardization
of administrative responses. Prescribed rules govern the work of public officials so
that all similar cases are managed in the same way.
New public administration focuses on processes (in this case, political participation
rather than rules) as well in its emphasis on the involvement and participation of the
socially and economically disadvantaged in the policy-making process for the
achievement of social equity. It appears that new public administration is not result
oriented since it does not tell us how to determine whether social equity has been
achieved. Probably due to its lack of performance measures or its overemphasis on
processes, new public administration’s maximum feasible participation was largely
unsuccessful.
NPM’s and networked governance’s adoption of market mechanisms leads to more
result-oriented government. NPM emphasizes economic rationalism, methods such as
strong customer service, performance-based contracting, and reliance on competition,
market incentives, and fiscal austerity measures that help make governments “work
better and cost less.” All these approaches target efficiency, enhanced performance,
and customer satisfaction, which are result oriented. That is, the practices of NPM
deemphasize processes such as democratic deliberation and standardized rules and
focus on ends or targets instead.
Networked governance is also result oriented. Its management paradigm emphasizes
democratic deliberation through which various stakeholders are involved in policymak-
ing and policy delivery, but it also adopts many of the market mechanisms associated
with NPM. However, they are all means to secure the goal that networked governance
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ultimately pursues—the public interest. The public interest concerns the broader interest
of the community and the long-term consequences of policy to it. Thus, in networked
governance the most important criteria for assessing management performance is how
effectively the management paradigm has advanced the public interest (Denhardt &
Denhardt, 2003, p. 9; Stoker, 2006).
FOURFOLD POLICY SCHEME AND PROPER 
MANAGEMENT PARADIGMS
This section analyzes the fourfold policy scheme from the perspective of public
management rather than of politics.3 For this purpose, it is imperative to illustrate the
subject from the standpoint of those that manage or administer each type of policy. In
addition, using the features of each type of public policy illustrated, I suggest an
appropriate management paradigm for each policy type, thereby matching means to
ends by fitting a management paradigm to a policy type.
Lowi’s widely used fourfold policy scheme (1972) subdivides public policies into
regulatory, distributive, redistributive, and constituent policies. Lowi (1985) argues that
the categories of public policy need to be understood as efforts to act on the intentions
of state (or rulers) that have been declared in the established lawful language of the
government.4 Because there is more than one way the state can declare an intention (or
more than one way the state can assert its coercive powers through public agencies),
there is more than one category of policy.
Regulatory Policies
Public managers and agencies that administer regulatory policies are responsible for
implementing laws restricting unfair competition and preventing the sale substandard
goods, for making or implementing rules imposing obligations on citizens, and for
providing sanction for nonconformance (Lowi, 1985, p. 85). In addition, the legislative
branch is inclined to delegate a great amount of policy-making authority to regulatory
agencies partly because legislators perceive that assuming control of regulatory policy
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3. The illustrations of the fourfold policy scheme here are based mainly on Kim’s (2007, pp.
59-78) study.
4. Lowi (1985) suggests that the classifications of public policy must not consider the likely
impacts of such public policies on the polity, society, or economy. Rather, he contents
focusing on the goal or intention of public policy.
may not be politically beneficial for the legislature (Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999, p. 8).
Therefore, legislators set general guidelines, and managers in regulatory agencies
expand these vague laws into certain policy actions through rule making (Meier, 1993,
p. 85). Since rule making is a quasi-legislative process in which interest groups are
heavily involved, regulatory policies create politics of “pluralism.”
Regulatory policies are the area where intense politics are involved but no market
mechanism appears. As illustrated above, regulatory agencies face harsh conflicts or
politics among various interests over the rule-making process, which indicates a low on
the politics-administration dichotomy. On the other hand, regulatory agencies formulate
and impose rules on citizens or interest groups rather than deliver benefits to them.
Thus, regulatory agencies are not in need of market mechanisms, such as privatization
or outsourcing, for the accomplishment of their regulatory duties. In turn, it appears
that for those working in the area of regulatory policies new public administration
would be an appropriate management paradigm to adopt (see Figure 1).
Although both the implementation of regulatory policies and the philosophical
basis of new public administration focus on the equity or fairness of those affected by
them, their constituencies are not identical. The constituency of new public administra-
tion—the disadvantaged and the poor—is narrower than that of regulatory policies—
the general public or interest groups. Consequently, it is recommended that public
managers in the sphere of regulatory policy rely on new public administration particu-
larly when their policy targets are socially or economically disadvantaged individuals.
Distributive Policies
Lowi (1985) regards distributive policies as being virtually the opposite of regula-
tory ones in mission. That is, distributive agencies are responsible for promoting and
fostering the interests of their clientele—that is, providing benefits such as research
results, services, grants and subsidies directly to citizens and organizations. Thus,
while regulatory agencies’ relationship with the public is that of controller and con-
trolled, the relationship between distributive agencies and the public is one of patron
and client. Distributive policies can be allocated and disaggregated in a non-zero-sum
way or on a unit-by-unit basis. In addition, distributive agencies need a great amount of
discretion in order to serve the particular demands of citizens effectively. A localized
or decentralized policy-making structure is imperative in the distributive policy realm,
and it often comes to be dominated by clients. Lowi (1979, p. 68) concisely illustrates
this tendency in the field of agriculture, noting that it is an area “where the distinction
between public and private has come closest to being completely eliminated. This has
been accomplished not by public expropriation of private domain . . . but by private
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expropriation of public authority.”
Networked governance would be most appropriate paradigm for carrying out 
distributive policies (see figure 1). That is, distributive policies are categorized as less
on the politics-administration dichotomy and more on the market mechanism because
of their decentralized policymaking process and privatized service delivery system,
respectively. The localized policy-making structure of distributive policies may foster
the participation of local stakeholders so that policies aimed at community well-being
can be made and implemented through social coordination among the community
members. On the other hand, distributive benefits are often delivered through privati-
zation or outsourcing (e.g., garbage collection, research consortiums). Networked 
governance would be an appropriate model for public managers whose job is to imple-
ment distributive polices because it focuses on deliberation and learning among stake-
holders and encourages taking an open-minded approach in selecting suppliers.
Furthermore, some distributive policy areas should be niches for NPM, particularly
its practices that focus on customer oriented services.5 Although NPM calls for a high
degree of separation between politics and administration (see Figure 1), it stresses
“empowering employees to get results” and “decentralizing decision making power”
(Rosenbloom, 1998, p. 22), which is signified with one of its key elements, entrepre-
neurial managers. NPM relies on a decentralized structure to enable individual units
in an agency to act as customer service centers (Rosenbloom, 1998, p. 25). In conse-
quence, as public managers become more responsive to customers’ demands, the
boundaries between public agencies and their external environments tend to become
less distinct (Rosenbloom, 1998, 25). This point is, to some extent, associated with
what Lowi (1979, p. 68) illustrated about distributive policy area as quoted above. In
short, NPM’s focus on customer orientation fits the nature of distributive policy that
fosters and promotes the interests of their clientele.
Redistributive Policies
Redistributive policies tax one group of individuals, the employed and rich, to pro-
vide benefits to another group, the unemployed and poor. That is, they aim to achieve
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5. NPM views the public almost exclusively as customers (Rosenbloom, 1998, 453). But
public administration scholars have not often addressed the status of the “public” in the
public administrative state (Rosenbloom, 1998, 454). For the most part, traditional public
administration treated the public as “cases”—that is, as routinely handled clients who fell
into similar categories (Rosenbloom, 1998, 485). NPM transformed the public from cases
to customers. In this regard, NPM has made an important contribution in the field of public
administration, reinvigorating and strengthening agencies’ commitment to service.
equity in society by balancing power between the “haves” and the “have-nots” (Forester,
1984, pp. 28-29). Redistributive policies (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid, affirmative action,
special community development efforts, categorical antipoverty grants, unemployment
insurance, and social security) are generally controversial, the source of ideological or
class conflicts between liberals and conservatives.
The controversial nature of redistributive policies leads to the centralization of policy-
making that confines the development of programs within the legislature. More specif-
ically, redistributive tax programs adopt an “ability to pay” system, such as taxes on
luxury items and a progressive income tax. Such redistributive tax programs signifi-
cantly affect those in the high-income brackets, since a small increase in, say, the
income tax in theses high-income bracket will seize a great amount of money from
individuals in the bracket.6 Thus, legislators tend to enact specific legislation, leaving
administrative agencies with no or little latitude to resolve such controversial problems
within the legislative branch and limiting the opportunities of agencies to cultivate
clientele (McCool, 1990, p. 284). Generally speaking, unlike regulatory and distributive
agencies, redistributive agencies do not have mutual exploitation and cooptation with
organized interest groups in the private sector because they do not interact with these
groups much. Furthermore, their lack of decision-making power leads redistributive
agencies to concentrate on mechanically executing policies specified by the legislative
branch.
Redistributive policies can be characterized as more in line with a management
paradigm that depends on a high degree of separation between politics and administra-
tion dichotomy and that does not depend much on market mechanisms (see figure 1).
This is because those managing redistributive policies are supposed to faithfully imple-
ment what the legislative branch decides and because no salient market mechanism
seems to be associated with the delivery of redistributive policies. Thus, it appears that
traditional public administration is the best approach for the implementation of redis-
tributive policies.
Constituent Policies
Constituent policies are conceptually the least mature of the four policy areas. These
policies—administrative/departmental reform policies, policies to create agencies and
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6. The other examples for which minor changes at the margins threaten great shifts of benefit
in the economy of major class interests are fraction of a percent in the discount rate, the
modification of a word in the explanation of eligibility, and a change of one element in the
composition of the CPI (Lowi, 1985, p. 93).
administer personnel, and budget policies, for example—are responsible for government
itself in that they are organized around not service provision but administrative goals.
They aim to benefit the government—that is, the government is the constituency. In
turn, unlike other line agencies, constituent agencies have minimal responsibility for
making or implementing rules that are associated directly with citizen conduct or 
status. Constituent agencies rather decide and implement “rules about rules”—i.e.,
rules applied to line agencies—to support or control the operations of line agencies.
Decision making in constituent policies hinges on interaction among a few rival
party leaders, but constituent policies engender relatively little conflict in the legisla-
ture because in-house, administrative affairs do not attract much interest or attention
from groups outside the government such as electorates or interest groups. Conse-
quently, presidents have greater influence over constituent policies (Spitzer, 1983, p.
150). However, the legislative branch may not delegate much policy-making power to
constituent agencies. The amount of power delegated to executive agencies from 
congressional committees is much lower in the area of civil service (i.e., a constituent
policy) than in other areas, such as public health (i.e., regulatory) or science and tech-
nology (i.e., distributive) (Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999, pp. 202-203). Thus, constituent
policies accord well with a management paradigm that depends on a high degree of
separation between politics and administration. Further, those implementing constituent
policies do not adopt market mechanism approaches from the private sector or out-
source service deliveries because the nature of constituent policies is administrative.
Therefore, the methods and techniques of traditional public administration are appro-
priate for constituent agencies to use.
Table 1 provides a summary of the preceding discussion connecting policy areas to
proper management paradigms. Generally speaking, different public management 
paradigms have different policy niches. New public administration matches regulatory
policy, networked governance and NPM (particularly, customer oriented practices)
makes a good fit with distributive policy, and traditional public administration is
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Table 1. Policy Type and Proper Management Paradigm
Policy type Proper management paradigm
Regulatory New public administration
Distributive Networked governanceNew public management (Customer-oriented practices)
Redistributive Traditional public administration
Constituent Traditional public administration 
appropriate for both redistributive and constituent policy.
It is important to point out, however, that NPM should be used in only limited areas
of distributive policy. NPM has often stressed relying on procedures for implementing
government policies that are similar to those supposedly used in private market activi-
ties and business, on the basis of presumption that public and private organizations are
adequately similar to make it possible to adopt similar techniques in both sectors
(Barzelay, 2001; Kettl, 2002). And so NPM techniques should only be adopted in 
distributive policy areas that are comparable to private market settings. A good example
of such a policy arena would be the U.S. Postal Service, which operates generally like
business firm in a market (Rosenbloom, 1998, p. 477). Such a public organization has
to invest in services for which there is powerful customer need and eliminate com-
pletely those without customer demand. Other distributive policy areas, however, call
for extensive stakeholder participation in policy making. Thus, where the practice of
public administration is not purely marketlike, networked governance, characterized
by reliance on market mechanisms but featuring little distinction between politics and
administration, would be the answer for government reformers.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This article has explored how to resolve the problematic issue of the “one-size-fits-
all” approach to public management paradigms by focusing on finding an appropriate
management paradigm for particular policy arena(s) based on two critical elements of
public administration—the politics-administration dichotomy and use of market mech-
anisms (Wilson, 1887). The study proposes that despite calls for an end to bureaucracy
(or hierarchy) (Pinchot & Pinchot, 1994; Thayer, 1973; Bevir, 2007), traditional public
administration is an appropriate choice in the areas of redistributive and constituent
policy. Moreover, new public administration works well for regulatory policy, whereas
networked governance and NPM (i.e., its customer orientation) are the right answer in
the arena of distributive policy. Overall, this maintains that an appropriate management
approach is dependent on the types of public policy that public officials are supposed
to implement (Rhodes, 1997; Keast et al., 2006; Jordan et al., 2005). Scholarly conver-
sation on modern governance should be geared toward finding the mix of management
paradigms that operates most efficiently in a given policy area. As Rhodes (1997, p.
139) has stated, “It’s the mix that matters.” However, the mix should be dependent on
the configuration of different policies that the government implements. In order that
public administrators are able to select the best management for implementing their
policies, it is critical for reformers or political leaders to delegate the authority that will
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enable them to surmount the one-size-fits-all approach to government reform.
In the future, researchers can assess the empirical validity of the propositions 
suggested here. For example, multiple case studies would tell us whether or not a given
policy type is critical to the success of the management paradigm. Moreover, although
this article broadly describes a certain type of policy such as regulatory, distributive,
and so on, for empirical studies it would be necessary to further specify types of policy
(e.g., pollution regulation, personnel management, research grant, etc.). For this purpose,
Ackroyd et al.’s (2007) study may provide us with a good model. They found that 
in the U.K., the effectiveness of NPM varied widely according to the area of public
services—housing (presumably, distributive policy), social services (i.e., redistributive
policy), and health care (i.e., redistributive policy). NPM was most successful in the
area of housing, whereas it was less effective in social services and health care. One of
their explanations for this is that compared with employees in social work and health
care who have strong attachments to a “public service ethos,” housing officers have
consistently been exposed to the private sector and its values (p. 23). Thus, housing
officers are better able to meet NPM objectives of efficiency and performance control,
as well as customer satisfaction. Furthermore, it might be meaningful for future
researchers to address policy arenas with mixed characteristics, such as one that contains
features of distributive and regulatory policy—farm subsidies, for example—or of 
distributive and redistributive policy—for instance, urban mass transit (Spitzer, 1983,
pp. 29-31). In these mixed policy arenas, it would be challenging for public adminis-
trators to adopt a single management paradigm or even to combine relevant multiple
management paradigms. Finally, future researchers may want to consider other situa-
tional factors, such as organizational type in addition to policy type. A multiple regres-
sion analysis incorporating different situational factors would or would not verify the
validity of the policy type variable. The results of such studies would suggest more
sophisticated guidelines for effective implementation of public management paradigms.
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